PHI 1010 IRSC Module 3 Edmund Gettiers and Peter Ungers Argument Discussion Discussion Board Topic 1) Explain Edmund Gettier’s argument from his article,

PHI 1010 IRSC Module 3 Edmund Gettiers and Peter Ungers Argument Discussion Discussion Board Topic

1) Explain Edmund Gettier’s argument from his article, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Present an argument either in defense or against Edmund Gettier’s objections to the justified-true-belief notion of knowledge.

2) Explain Peter Unger’s argument from his piece, An Argument for Skepticism. Do you think Peter Unger is correct to claim that certainty is required for knowledge? If so, then offer an argument in defense of his position. If not, then offer an argument in objection to his position.

3) Does Descartes argument about his own existence give us reason to reject Unger’s claim that certainty requires one to be dogmatic, and thus it is unreasonable to claim certainty? If so, then offer an argument in defense of this position. If not, then offer an argument in objection to this position.

Answer the set of questions above in a minimum of three full paragraphs and respond to at least two peer’s posts.
Be sure to read the following three (3) documents for more details: Hume is an Empiricist
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Empiricist: Knowledge is based on Experience.
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Rationalist: Knowledge can be obtained through
pure reason alone.
Objection to Empiricism
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Rationalist ask the empiricist how they can
account for novel (new) ideas if all knowledge is
based on experience.
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The response offered by empiricist can be found
by taking a look at David Hume’s Copy
Principle (see next slide).
Hume’s Copy Principle
We permute and combine simple ideas in the imagination to
form complex ideas
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Complex ideas may be about things we have never experienced (like
unicorns).
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But they are composed of simple ideas which we have experienced,
like horses and horns.
Causality & Hume On Causes
Distinguishing Between Causes and Correlations.
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Correlation and Causation
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Correlation does not necessarily imply causation
Differences
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Correlations are symmetrical (they go both ways):
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?
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If A is positively correlated with B, then B will be positively
correlated with A.
If in a jar of marbles all the large marbles are orange and all the
orange marbles are large, then they correlate both ways.
? Large = Orange
? Orange = Large
Causation is not symmetrical (they go in one direction).
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Simply because taking poison causes death, does not mean that death
causes taking poison.
? Taking Poison = Death
? Death ? Taking Poison
Causation has a temporal order
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First you take the poison, then you die.
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But temporal order is not enough to explain the source of
the asymmetry.
Some correlations have a temporal order as well.
Many people own ashtrays
prior to getting cancer.
• But we do not think that
owning ashtrays causes cancer.
•
Causal Production
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Causes produce their effects!
There is a direct relationship between causes and
their effects.
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Production is temporally ordered: squeezing a cow’s
udder produces milk after you squeeze it.
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Production is asymmetrical: milk doesn’t produce
the squeezing of the udder.
Hume’s Take
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We can never see anything more than actual
association. We can never get behind the actual
association and see production.
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We never see a power of A to produce B.
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We just see A happen and then B happen.
Remember, as an empiricist Hume argues that all knowledge
is derived from experience. So, when we have the experience
of B following A every time, then we begin to think there is a
causal relationship, but we never see the actual power. We
just see the two events: A happening, then B happening.
If a correlation has obtained every time, we suspect a
causal relationship.
How do we know?
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Hume wants to know: how do we come to
know about causes?
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How do we distinguish a correlation that has held
every time from a cause?
Causes and effects are discovered, not by
abstract reason but through experience.
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So again, all we really experience are the two events
occurring. We cannot really see the “power” of one
causing the other.
Hume uses the two following terms:
Constant conjunction vs. Necessary connection
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Constant Conjunction: When something has always
followed (without failure) something else in the past.
This is a correlation that has always held.
? We cannot say for sure that in the future when A happens
that B will follow—all we can say is that so far it “has”
followed every time.
?
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Necessary Connection: When one thing is the
necessary result of another thing.
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In other words, when A happens, B must happen.
But how can we tell the difference
when looking at them?
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Necessary connections and Constant
Conjunctions look the same!
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Thus, Hume questions how we can tell the
difference between a correlation that has held
every time (constant conjunction) versus a cause
(necessary connection).
Constant conjunction vs. Necessary connection
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How do we come to know about causes as something
distinct from constant conjunctions?
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How do we come to have knowledge of one thing
having a power to bring about something else—of a
necessary connection between two events?
Observation?
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Hume happily admits that we can observe
constant conjunctions.
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But how do we observe necessary connections?
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Think of the billion sided dice (from the reading).
How do we observe “the power to produce
effects”?
Three places to look
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1. Between bodies and bodies
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2. Between the mind and bodies
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3. Between mental objects and mental objects.
Bodies and Bodies
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• When we look about us towards external objects, and consider
the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to
discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which
binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible
consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually,
in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is
attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears
to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward
impression from this succession of objects: consequently, there is
not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any
thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.
Body ? Body
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We cant see powers.
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If we could see the power, we could predict effects without
experience, but we cant:
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From the first appearance of an object, we never can
conjecture what effect will result from it. We must
experience it first.
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But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by
the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without
experience.
An important form of argument
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If causes/powers between A and B were
observable, then I could predict that B will follow
A before observing B.
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I can’t predict B prior to observing it (at least once)
Therefore: I can’t observe a “power” of A to bring
about B.
? Therefore: the conjunction of A and B don’t legitimate
the notion of causation.
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Mind
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Hume realizes that not all of his contemporaries believe only
in physical objects, or “external objects.” What about the
mind?
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Can we directly observe the causal effects of the mind on the
body?
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(commanding your arm to move)
Can we directly observe the causal effects of the mind on the
mind?
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(thinking of the president of the United States and coming up with
Washington)
Mind ? Body
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We only know this from experience.
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If your arm became paralyzed, you wouldn’t know it
until you tried to move it.
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We don’t even understand how the mind affects
the body. So, clearly, we don’t have a direct
impression of the one producing the other.
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Furthermore, mind body problem (we cover this
in module 4).
Mind?Mind
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The command of the mind over itself is limited,
especially regarding the passions and sentiments.
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We can’t know in advance what those limits will
be.
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Self command of the mind varies with the time
of the day, and again, only experience tells us
this.
Hume’s negative conclusion
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It appears that, in single instances of the operation of
bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover
anything but one event following another, without
being able to comprehend any force or power by which
the cause operates, or any connexion between it and its
supposed effect.
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All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event
follows another; but we never can observe any tie
between them. They seem conjoined, but never
connected.
What does Hume conclude
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Does he conclude that we shouldn’t believe in
causes?
A naturalistic answer
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Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment;
and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that
there is no idea.
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In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is
nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest
any idea of power or necessary connexion.
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But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is
always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the
notion of cause and connexion. We then feel a new sentiment or
impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or
imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and this
sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for.
In a nutshell
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Causes exist for Hume:
But we cannot really have knowledge of them.
? They exist only in the human mind, as part of
human nature
? Of our customary habits
?
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When we see A constantly followed by B, we
imagine a power of A over B. It’s just normal
human nature.
The End
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
(1777 edition)
David Hume, Esq;
ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON SEVERAL
SUBJECTS Vol II CONTAINING An
ENQUIRY concerning HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING; A DISSERTATION on
the PASSIONS; An ENQUIRY concerning the
PRINCIPLES of MORALS; AND The
NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION.
Originally published: London 1777
Web edition : Leeds Electronic Text Centre, July 2000
(text prepared by Peter Millican from the edition held in the Brotherton)
SECTION VI. Of PROBABILITY.
THOUGH there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real cause of any event
has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.
There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and according
as this superiority encreases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a
proportionable encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side, in which we
discover the superiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides, and
with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would be more probable, that the
former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner, and
only one side different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the
event more steady and secure. This process of the thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious;
but to those who consider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious speculation.
It seems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to discover the event, which may result from the
throw of such a dye, it considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable; and this is the
very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended in it, entirely equal. But
finding a greater number of sides concur in the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more
frequently to that event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various possibilities or chances, on which
the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of several views in one particular event begets
immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives that event the
advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a smaller number of views, and recurs less
frequently to the mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an
object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps, in some
measure, be accounted for. The concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more
strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigour; renders its influence on the passions and
affections more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes the nature of
belief and opinion.
The case is the same with the probability of causes, as with that of chance. There are some causes,
which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever yet
been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always burned, and water
suffocated every human creature: The production of motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law,
which has hitherto admitted of no exception. But there are other causes, which have been found more
irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, or opium a soporific to every one, who
has taken these medicines. It is true, when any cause fails of producing its usual effect, philosophers
ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but suppose, that some secret causes, in the particular
structure of parts, have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, however, and conclusions concerning
the event are the same as if this principle had no place. Being determined by custom to transfer the past
to the future, in all our inferences; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the
event with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition. But where different
effects have been found to follow from causes, which are to appearance exactly similar, all these
various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future, and enter into our
consideration, when we determine the probability of the event. Though we give the preference to that
which has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we must not overlook the other
effects, but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have
found it to be more or less frequent. It is more probable, in almost every country of EUROPE, that there
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will be frost sometime in JANUARY, than that the weather will continue open throughout that whole
month; though this probability varies according to the different climates, and approaches to a certainty
in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it seems evident, that, when we transfer the past to the
future, in order to determine the effect, which will result from any cause, we transfer all the different
events, in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past, and conceive one to have existed a
hundred times, for instance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of views do here
concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget that sentiment which we call
belief, and give its object the preference above the contrary event, which is not supported by an equal
number of experiments, and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future.
Let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of
philosophy, and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part, I shall think it sufficient, if the
present hints excite the curiosity of philosophers, and make them sensible how defective all common
theories are in treating of such curious and such sublime subjects.
SECTION VII. Of the IDEA of NECESSARY CONNEXION.
PART I.
THE great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the
former, being sensible, are always clear and determinate, the smallest distinction between them is
immediately perceptible, and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas, without ambiguity
or variation. An oval is never mistaken for a circle, nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis. The isosceles and
scalenum are distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and virtue, right and wrong. If any term
be defined in geometry, the mind readily, of itself, substitutes, on all occasions, the definition for the
term defined: Or even when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the senses,
and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended. But the finer sentiments of the mind, the
operations of the understanding, the various agitations of the passions, though really in themselves
distinct, easily escape us, when surveyed by reflection; nor is it in our power to recal the original
object, as often as we have occasion to contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means, is gradually
introduced into our reasonings: Similar objects are readily taken to be the same: And the conclusion
becomes at last very wide of the premises.
One may safely, however, affirm, that, if we consider these sciences in a proper light, their advantages
and disadvantages nearly compensate each other, and reduce both of them to a state of equality. If the
mind, with greater facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it must carry on a much
longer and more intricate chain of reasoning, and compare ideas much wider of each other, in order to
reach the abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas are apt, without extreme care, to fall into
obscurity and confusion, the inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions, and the
intermediate steps, which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the sciences which treat of
quantity and number. In reality, there is scarcely a proposition in EUCLID so simple, as not to consist of
more parts, than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into chimera and conceit.
Where we trace the principles of the human mind through a few steps, we may be very well satisfied
with our progress; considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning causes, and
reduces us to an acknowledgment of our ignorance. The chief obstacle, therefore, to our improvement
in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The
principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought, requisite to
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the forming of any conclusion. And, perhaps, our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by
the want of proper experiments and phaenomena, which are often discovered by chance, and cannot
always be found, when requisite, even by the most diligent and prudent enquiry. As moral philosophy
seems hitherto to have received less improvement than either geometry or physics, we may conclude,
that, if there be any difference in this respect among these sciences, the difficulties, which obstruct the
progress of the former, require superior care and capacity to be surmounted.
There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of power,
force, energy, or necessary connexion, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our
disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavour, in this section, to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of
these terms, and thereby remove some part of that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this
species of philosophy.
It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies
of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of any thing, which we have
not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses. I have endeavoured * to explain and
prove this proposition, and have expressed my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach
a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have hitherto been able to
attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration
of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most
simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? By
what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate
to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or original sentiments, from which the ideas are
copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only
placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent ideas, which lie in
obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics, by which,
in the moral sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily
under our apprehens…
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