Relationship Between Religion & Extreme Religious Intergroup Conflict Paper ?? 1. Give a brief explanation of the relationship between religion and intergro

Relationship Between Religion & Extreme Religious Intergroup Conflict Paper ?? 1. Give a brief explanation of the relationship between religion and intergroup conflict.
??2. Explain two unique research problems created by cases of extreme religion-based intergroup conflict.
For example, “The unique research problems that arise from this conflict include determining if religion is the cause of the conflict, or if it just happens to be an additional component that arises from something else like ethinicity or nationalism (Seul, 1999). Another research problem is in regard to the relationship between religion and modernity. In other words, how psychologically committed one is to their identity within a religion versus their personal experience in a multinational/religious society (Seul, 1999).”

??3. Finally, explain two strategies that might be used for reconciliation after extreme religion-based intergroup conflict.

Be sure to support your postings and responses with specific references to the Learning Resources and the current literature.

READINGS
Paluck, E. L. (2009). Reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict using the media: A field experiment in Rwanda. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(3), 574–587.
Retrieved from the Walden Library databases.
Seul, J. R. (1999). ‘Ours is the way of God’: Religion, identity, and intergroup conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 36(5), 553–569.
Retrieved from the Walden Library databases.
Staub, E. (2006). Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing, or intractable conflict: Understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery, and steps toward a general theory. Political Psychology, 27(6), 867–894.
Retrieved from the Walden Library databases. Political Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 6, 2006
Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing, or
Intractable Conflict: Understanding the Roots of
Violence, Psychological Recovery, and Steps toward
a General Theory
Ervin Staub
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
This article explores psychological avenues to reconciliation between groups. It describes
the psychological changes in survivors, perpetrators, and passive bystanders in the course
of the evolution of increasing violence and points to healing from the psychological wounds
created as an essential component of reconciliation. It also explores the role of understanding the roots of genocide, and of violence between groups in general, in contributing to
healing, to the creation of a shared history in place of the usually contradictory histories
held by groups that have been in violent conflict, and to reconciliation in general. The role
of processes that have been emphasized in the literature on reconciliation, such as truth,
justice, and contact between groups are discussed. Bottom up approaches focusing on the
population and top down approaches involving leaders and the media, and the importance
of changes in institutions and structures are discussed. The article exemplifies many of the
issues and processes by a discussion of the genocide in Rwanda, and by the description of
interventions, ranging from work with small groups, including leaders and the media, to
radio programs that aimed to further reconciliation, as well as research evaluating an
intervention.
KEY WORDS: genocide, healing/psychological recovery, reconciliation, understanding the roots of
genocide, prevention, mass violence
When violence between groups comes to a halt the building of constructive,
nonviolent relations between groups becomes possible. However, violence often
resumes (Long & Brecke, 2003). The psychological wounds that have resulted from
the violence and fear, mistrust or hate may interfere with building better relations
and lead to renewed violence (de la Rey, 2001). Violence may resume even if it was
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halted by negotiations and agreements between parties (de Silva & Samarasinghe,
1993). This is the case because agreements are often not satisfying to all segments
of the hostile groups, because they may not be appropriately carried out, and by
themselves they do not sufficiently alter the psychological realities of group
members created by past history. This applies, for example, to the Oslo agreements
between Israelis and Palestinians, which for a while diminished violence
(McCauley, 2002a, 2002b). “The peace accord is at best a rough blueprint . . .
Whether lasting peace will be constructed depends on what happens next” (Boyce,
2002, p. 8). Renewed violence is probably an even greater danger when extreme
violence is stopped by one party defeating the other, as in the case of Rwanda.
One aim of this article is to note some of the psychological effects of group
violence on the parties to the violence and thereby identify their psychological
situation when reconciliation might start. Another is to describe an approach that
my associates and I have developed and used in Rwanda to promote healing—or
psychological recovery—and reconciliation, research we have conducted to evaluate its effectiveness (Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005), and varied
uses of the approach in Rwanda (Staub and Pearlman, 2001, 2006; Staub,
Pearlman, & Miller, 2003). Reconciliation has special urgency for preventing new
violence in situations, like Rwanda, where groups remain intermixed. We have
used both bottom-up approaches to reconciliation, which attempt to promote
changes in the population, and top-down approaches working with the media and
leaders who can shape the attitudes of the community as well as the nature of
institutions that may further reconciliation. I will also discuss the political and
social context of these interventions. Another aim is to emphasize the value and
potential uses of one of the elements of our approach, promoting understanding of
the roots of violence. A final purpose is to briefly describe other processes that the
literature indicates are important for reconciliation, to note relationships with
elements of our approach, when they exist, and to initiate steps toward a general
conception of reconciliation.
What is Reconciliation?
Reconciliation may be defined as mutual acceptance by groups of each other
(Staub & Pearlman, 2001; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003). The essence of reconciliation
is a changed psychological orientation toward the other. Reconciliation means that
victims and perpetrators, or members of hostile groups, do not see the past as
defining the future, as simply a continuation of the past. It means that they come
to see the humanity of one another, accept each other, and see the possibility of a
constructive relationship. This definition is consistent with other definitions, which
focus on restoring a damaged relationship and on both the processes involved and
the outcome (Broneus, 2003; de la Rey, 2001; Kriesberg, 1998b; Lederach, 1997).
While the focus of this definition (and of the interventions described in the
article) is psychological change, institutions and how they operate are important,
Reconciliation after Genocide
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both in promoting reconciliation, and in solidifying or maintaining psychological
changes that can be subverted by political and social processes. Whether the media
devalues or humanizes groups, how the justice system or schools operate, the
nature of leadership, and structural justice or the situation of groups in society are
crucial in promoting or hindering reconciliation. However, when psychological
interventions affect leaders or the media, they can bring about institutional change.
For example, if journalists come to present issues between groups in a manner that
promotes reconciliation rather than incites hostility, this can be regarded as change
in the media as an institution.
There is extensive interest in reconciliation, but as yet limited research (e.g.,
Byrne, 2003, 2004; Gibson, 2002, 2004; Staub et al., 2005). Much of the already
substantial literature describes practical efforts, like truth and reconciliation commissions, or interventions by practitioners, or focuses on theory (e.g., Abu-Nimer,
2001; Lederach, 1997; Proceedings, 2002; Volkan, 1997). However, reconciliation
is also an aspect of the prevention of violence and peacemaking and can be
facilitated by processes such as contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006),
peace education (Salomon & Nevo, 2002), and dialogue and interactive problem
solving (Kelman, 1990; Kelman & Fisher, 2003; Ross & Rothman, 1999; Rouhana
& Kelman, 1994).
A Brief History of the Genocide and Its Aftermath in Rwanda
Starting on April 7, 1994, the day after snipers shot down the plane carrying
the President of Rwanda, over a 100-day period Hutus killed about 700,000 Tutsis,
as well as about 50,000 politically moderate Hutus. Estimates of the number of
people killed vary, and of how many people were killed in each group, but this is
a relatively common estimate (des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2002; Prunier, 1995).
The killings were accompanied by rape, the mutilation of women, and other forms
of physical and psychological violence and torture. The perpetrators in this
government-organized violence included parts of the military, young men in
paramilitary groups, and ordinary people. This was an “intimate genocide” (Staub
& Pearlman, 2001), neighbors killing neighbors, and people in mixed families
killing family members and occasionally even their own children (des Forges,
1999; Mamdani, 2002).
The genocide evolved out of a past history of conflict and violence. A long
history of dominance by the minority Tutsis (about 14% of the population) over
the majority Hutus (about 85%) greatly intensified under the colonial rule of the
Belgians. The Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda live next to each other and share the
same language and religion, primarily Catholic. They may have been originally
different ethnic groups, but the primary differences over time became those of
occupation, class, power, and social identities. The Tutsis tended cattle, were
wealthier, and had power, while the Hutus were agriculturalists (des Forges, 1999;
Mamdani, 2002).
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Starting with a so-called white paper in 1916, the Belgians developed a racist
ideology of Tutsi superiority (Mamdani, 2002) and used the Tutsis to govern the
country. The condition of the Hutus progressively deteriorated. In 1959 a Hutu
rebellion, in which about 50,000 Tutsis were killed, brought Hutus to power. After
independence from Belgian rule in 1962, there was Hutu violence and discrimination against Tutsis, including mass killings in the early 1960s and 1970s. The
government did not allow refugees from this violence to return. In 1990, the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) entered the country from Uganda, composed
mainly of children of Tutsi refugees. A civil war began, with a cease fire in 1993,
followed by the Arusha Accords that delineated plans for a government shared by
Tutsis and Hutus.
While there was greater political openness and new political parties were
created, among the Hutus an ideology of “Hutu power” developed and was propagated by elements of the government and media, intensifying fear and devaluation
of Tutsis. The Tutsis were going to kill everyone, they would take away people’s
property, they would rule over Hutus as before. A “Hutu Ten Commandments”
propagated violent action against all Tutsis. The genocide began, and with the
world watching but remaining passive it continued until the RPA defeated the
government army (des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 1999a).
Since then, the power has been in the hands of the minority Tutsis. In the years
immediately following the genocide, there were incursions by perpetrators, now
refugees in the Congo, killing more Tutsis in the Northwest. With many Tutsis who
were refugees in neighboring countries returning, the distribution of the population
is about the same as before the genocide. Members of the groups live next to each
other as neighbors, as before. The government initiated a policy of unity and
reconciliation, a rare, intentional societal process to help people heal and reconcile. However, as part of unity, people are expected to consider themselves Rwandans and not to use the terms Hutu and Tutsi. Discussing differences between the
groups has been called “divisionism.” This policy does now allow Hutus to express
their concerns and identity. In the former Yugoslavia, where the government, led
by Tito, did not allow an exploration of the mass killing of Serbs by Croats that
took place during the second World War, the inattention to deep psychological
wounds and past group relations is likely to have contributed to the violence during
the 1990s (Staub, 1996). While in Rwanda there is a justice process (see below),
this policy is a source of potential conflict.
Over the years the government in Rwanda has become increasingly intolerant
of “divisionism,” at times applying the term, and also the more extreme accusation
of propagating genocidal ideology, to individuals and groups that it sees as potential opposition. Some of these individuals have been prosecuted and some groups
have been outlawed, including the primary opposition party at the time of the 2003
presidential elections. Such societal processes affect reconciliation (Uvin, 2003).
However, in Rwanda there are also continuing positive processes, such as equality
in admission to education and activities that promote reconciliation. In some of our
Reconciliation after Genocide
871
work we have collaborated with the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, a
government organization. And it was at the invitation of high-level government
officials to expand the scope of our reconciliation efforts that we began to develop
the radio programs described below, which among other things advocate opposition to leaders who promote policies of devaluation and hostility, active bystandership and pluralism. Inconsistent and at times contradictory policies and practices
are likely to be present in many post-conflict situations, due to the influence of
complex circumstances and psychological forces.
The Impact of Mass Violence
The Evolution of Violence. Understanding the psychological situation of survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders—witnesses who are part of the perpetrator
group but have not been directly involved in violence—is important for reconciliation. This psychological situation is not only the result of the violence, but also of
what happens in the course of its evolution.
The Effects on Survivors. Whether it is the outcome of a conflict that has
become intractable, or the result of difficult life conditions and psychological and
social processes that follow from them, mass killing and genocide are the end
points of an evolution of harmdoing (see Staub, 1989b, 2003). In the course of this
evolution the victims are increasingly devalued, are identified as enemies of an
ideology that perpetrators create, and are harmed in varied ways. They tend to feel
abandoned and betrayed by former neighbors, friends, lovers, and, in mixed
families, even by family members who break off relations with them, as in
Germany during the Nazi era (Staub, 1989b), or engage in violence against them,
as in Rwanda (des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2002). The survivors carry the impact
of both the increasing persecution and violence and of the mass killing or genocide. Their basic needs for security, for feelings of effectiveness and control over
important events in one’s life, for positive identity, for positive connections to
other people and communities, and for a comprehension of reality and of one’s
own place in the world have all been deeply frustrated (Staub, 1989b, 2003; Staub
& Pearlman, 2001, 2006).
Victimized people tend to suffer from both PTSD and complex trauma
(Herman, 1992; McCann & Pearlman, 1990). They feel diminished and vulnerable, seeing the world, other people, and especially members of groups other than
their own as dangerous. Without healing, when there is new group conflict, it will
be difficult for them to consider the needs of the other and to trust the other, and
thereby to resolve conflict peacefully. In response to threat they may strike out,
believing that they need to defend themselves, but actually becoming perpetrators.
Healing, or psychological recovery, can improve the quality of their lives, make
unnecessary “defensive” violence by them less likely, and help them become open
enough to the perpetrator group to engage with processes of reconciliation (Staub,
1998; Staub & Pearlman, 2006.)
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The Effects on Perpetrators and Passive Bystanders. Usually a group turns
against an already devalued group or is unable to resolve conflict because of its
negative view and mistrust of the other group. In the course of harmful actions,
individual actors and the group as a whole change. They learn by doing. They
justify their actions by increasingly devaluing the victims and excluding them
from the moral realm (Fein, 1979, 1993; Opotaw, 1990; Staub, 1989b, 1990). In
the end there may be a reversal of morality; killing the victims becomes the right
thing to do (Staub, 1989b). New institutions are created that serve discrimination
and violence. In intractable conflict group beliefs evolve about the group’s just
cause and the enemy’s responsibility for the conflict and violence (Bar-Tal, 2000;
Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003).
Participation in mass violence also creates trauma. People who have killed,
including soldiers, are traumatized by their actions (Laufer, Brett, & Gallops,
1985; McNair, 2002; Parson, 1984; Rhodes, Allen, Nowicki, & Cillesen, 2002).
Vietnam veterans who engaged in atrocities, in violence that is extreme, unnecessary, and/or directed at civilians were especially affected (McNair, 2002). Those
who execute genocide routinely engage in atrocities. Group support, ideology, and
changes due to learning-by-doing serve to some extent as protective mechanisms.
But as they protect from trauma, guilt, and shame, they diminish empathy for
victims (Browning, 1992). The restriction of empathy tends to generalize, and
violence often expands beyond the original victim group (des Forges, 1999; Staub,
1989b). After the violence is stopped, perpetrators tend to maintain the rightness
of their actions and continue to devalue and blame the victims. They surround
themselves with a defensive shield (Staub & Pearlman, 2006).
Although once a genocide starts some people endanger themselves to save lives
(Africa Rights, 2002; Oliner & Oliner, 1988), passivity by witnesses/bystanders in
the course of the evolution of harmdoing is the norm (Staub, 1989b). The psychological effects of passivity are similar to but less intense than the effects of
perpetration. To reduce their own distress, passive members of the perpetrator group
tend to distance themselves from victims, in part by accepting justifications offered
by perpetrators, and by blaming and devaluing victims. This reduces empathy and
inhibits guilt, perhaps with the help of the commonly held belief in a just world,
where innocent people do not suffer (Lerner, 1980). As bystanders change, at least
some of them join the perpetrators (Lifton, 1986; Staub, 1989a, 1989b).
Perpetrators of even relatively minor harmdoing tend to minimize the harm
they have caused (Baumeister, 1997). The profound changes in identity, values,
views of themselves, and views of the victims and probably of human beings in
general makes it extremely difficult for perpetrators of and passive bystanders to
mass violence to acknowledge, presumably to themselves as well as others, that
their actions were wrong. Few perpetrators showed regret or expressed sympathy
for their victims in testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa (Broneus, 2003; Byrne, 2003, 2004). Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who
participated by e-mail in the New York Times “conference” on the Internet on
Reconciliation after Genocide
873
Bosnia: Uncertain Paths to Peace in 1995 did not acknowledge their own group’s
contribution to the conflict and violence but always pointed at the other groups.1 The
inability to acknowledge harmdoing interferes not only with reconciliation but also
with being reincluded in the moral community, which perpetrators presumably want
(Nadler, 2003). Healing from the wounds created by one’s actions or the actions of
one’s group may lighten their weight and may enable people to begin to assume
responsibility and undo the transformation—in their orientation to the victims, to
people in general, and in their personality and values. The resulting greater openness
to the other group may facilitate reconciliation. While the nature of psychological
wounds of survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders varies greatly, as does the moral
meaning of their woundedness, healing by each group can facilitate reconciliation.
Elements of an Approach to Reconciliation and Its Applications
in Rwanda
Effective reconciliation requires engaging with and changes in a whole range
of actors in a society, from members of the population whose psychological
orientation is the core to reconciliation, to national leaders who can shape policies,
practices, and institutions. In this spirit, our “interventions” have come to include
over time training of the stuff of NGOs that worked with groups in the community,
seminars/workshops with community leaders, journalists, and national leaders
(government ministers…
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