WK9 The Issue of Climate Refugees The paper is a philosophy class final paper and required using in-class reading sources with proper MLA citation. It shou

WK9 The Issue of Climate Refugees The paper is a philosophy class final paper and required using in-class reading sources with proper MLA citation. It should be fine worked and high quality. It requires introduction, analysis of two readings and arguments of two authors, my own argument and reasons to support it. Journal of Applied Philosophy,Vol. 27, No. 4, 2010
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2010.00498.x
Ecological Refugees, States Borders, and the
Lockean Proviso
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CARA NINE
abstract Ecological refugees are expected to make up an increasing percentage of overall
refugees in the coming decades as predicted climate change related disasters will displace millions
of people. In this essay, I focus on those rights ecological refugees may claim on the basis of
collective self-determination. To this end, I will focus on a few specific cases that I call cases of
‘ecological refugee states’. Tuvalu, the Maldives, and to a certain extent, Bangladesh are
predicted to be ecological refugee states in the near future.These are states whose entire (or close
to it) geographical territory is predicted to be lost to rising sea levels; the collective body of the
people will itself become an ecological refugee.
The question is: what may the people of an ecological refugee state legitimately claim on the
basis of their right to self-determination? Should we redraw state borders to accommodate a New
Tuvalu? I argue that a plausible position regarding territorial rights is that when (1) a people
clearly is (or recently was) self-determining and has a legitimate claim to continue to be
self-determining, and (2) the self-determination of a people is existentially threatened because
the people lacks territorial rights, that (3) the people becomes a candidate for sovereign over a
new territory. The result is that existing state borders may need to change to accommodate
something like a New Tuvalu. To generate these results on behalf of ecological refugee states, I
examine the principles of the system of territorial states. Because the system of territorial states
is a system of exclusive rights over goods, especially land, it is possible that it is subject to the
conditions of a Lockean proviso mechanism. This paper is dedicated mainly to adapting a
version of the Lockean proviso for use in territorial rights theory.
Ecological refugees are expected to make up an increasing percentage of overall refugees
in the coming decades as predicted climate change related disasters will displace millions
of people. In this essay, I focus on the rights of ecological refugees. In particular, I
address those rights of collective self-determination attributable to ecological refugees.
To this end, I will focus on a few specific cases that I call cases of ‘ecological refugee
states’. Tuvalu, the Maldives, and to a certain extent, Bangladesh are predicted to be
ecological refugee states in the near future. These are states whose entire (or close to it)
geographical territory is predicted to be lost to rising sea levels; the collective body of the
people will itself become an ecological refugee.
In this essay I assume that, (1) the people of currently existing, legitimate states have
a collective right of self-determination,1 and (2) that the loss of existing territorial
domain due to ecological disaster does not eliminate this right of self-determination. I do
not think that these assumptions are controversial. The former follows by definition of
‘self-determination’ and the term’s non-controversial application to the people of existing legitimate states, and the denial of the latter would be morally arbitrary.
© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2010, Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main
Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
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The question is: what may the people of an ecological refugee state legitimately claim
on the basis of their right to self-determination?
Can they, on the basis of their right to self-determination, claim a right to a new
territory? In this essay I focus on answering this question specifically. I ask questions
about cases: Should we redraw state borders to accommodate a New Tuvalu? I argue that
a plausible position regarding territorial rights is that when (1) a people clearly is (or
recently was) self-determining and has a legitimate claim to continue to be selfdetermining, and (2) the self-determination of a people is existentially threatened
because the people lacks territorial rights, that (3) the people becomes a candidate for
sovereign over a new territory.2 The result is that existing state borders may need to
change to accommodate something like a New Tuvalu.
To generate these results on behalf of ecological refugee states, I examine the principles of the system of territorial states. Because the system of territorial states is a system
of exclusive rights over goods, especially land, it is possible that it is subject to the
conditions of a Lockean proviso mechanism. This paper is dedicated mainly to adapting
a version of the Lockean proviso for use in territorial rights theory. First, I argue that the
Lockean proviso mechanism applied to territory should be employed to protect the
interests of self-determining groups. Second, I develop a version of the Lockean proviso
appropriate for use regarding territorial entitlements; I argue that the proviso mechanism
applied to territorial rights should not be interpreted as a constraint on the acquisition
of rights over territory, but rather it should be understood as a restraint on current
territorial holdings. Finally, I develop some suggestions from the Lockean proviso
mechanism regarding the location and conditions involving the establishment of something like New Tuvalu.
As a preliminary note, it has been argued on egalitarian grounds (such as common,
equal ownership of the earth) that in cases like ecological refugee states, these groups
should be treated as a candidate for sovereign over some territory as a matter of a
principle of equality.3 Matthias Risse argues in a similar vein that individual ecological
refugees are owed immigration and resettlement rights on the basis of individual
common ownership rights of the earth.4 However, my argument here differs in that I do
not start from a point of egalitarian distribution of entitlements. Instead, I take up a more
conservative position that allows for unequal entitlements over territory, and I argue that
from this starting point, with the use of a Lockean proviso mechanism, there is sufficient
reason to believe that an ecological refugee state should be treated as a candidate for
sovereign over some territory.
The Lockean Proviso and Territorial Rights
An ecological refugee state is a state whose entire territory is lost to ecological disaster.
Currently, a state facing such disaster is Tuvalu. Leading scientists predict that over the
next century the small island nation of Tuvalu, located north of New Zealand, will almost
entirely submerge under rising ocean levels. Tuvalu’s territory that is not lost to the sea
will be uninhabitable due to saltwater intrusion contaminating drinking water and
agricultural lands. Tuvalu is not alone, although it is the most immediate case of an
imminent ecological refugee state, a state whose territory is wholly destroyed by ecological disaster.
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Ecological Refugees, States Borders, and the Lockean Proviso
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In this section, I argue that an imminent threat to the self-determination of a people,
as in the case of ecological refugee states, activates a version of the Lockean proviso
applied to territorial rights. The result is that the ecological refugee state is a candidate
as sovereign over some other land even if they have no historical claim to that land. First,
I argue that the Lockean proviso applied to territory should be employed to protect the
interests of self-determining groups. Second, I argue that the position that ecological
refugee states are candidates for sovereign over some territory, even if that territory is
already under the jurisdiction of another state, is supported by several different interpretations of the Lockean proviso adapted to fit territorial rights.
The Lockean Proviso and Self-Determination
In this section I explain how the Lockean proviso applied to territorial rights should, at
some level of analysis, be about groups rather than about individuals.
The original Lockean proviso is a limit on property rights. Property rights are not
territorial rights. However, to understand how to apply the Lockean proviso to territorial
rights, we must understand what conditions trigger the Lockean proviso in the property
case. Elsewhere, I defend the position that a Lockean theory of territorial rights should
be understood as a collectivistic theory, and that a territorial right is held by a collective;
territorial rights are not conceptually nor normatively dependant on property rights.5
Here I explain how the Lockean proviso can be applied to collective territorial rights. I
use the property rights analysis of the proviso only as an analogy to better understand the
proviso’s function as a limitation on rights to goods.
Property rights aren’t inherently justified, at least not on a traditional Lockean theory
of property rights. Property rights are justified on the basis of some other value(s). On
threat of becoming self-defeating, the Lockean proviso is triggered at least when the
object(s) of these foundational values is threatened. For Locke, a system of private
property rights is justified because of its ultimate benefit to humankind. Locke expresses
the motivation behind private property rights to land through his articulation of the law
of nature. The law of nature imposes on us a duty to undertake actions which tend to
preserve humankind.6 Certain ways of using (or not using) the land will tend toward
preservation. Certain ways of articulating rights to land will encourage or make possible
this more beneficial use of the land.Therefore we should articulate rights to lands in ways
that encourage and make possible its beneficial use towards the preservation of humankind. This is one reason why an institution of private property rights is justified. A
necessary condition for the justification of the institution of private property is that it
results in a pattern of land use that promotes the preservation of humankind.
We have a duty of natural law to preserve humankind. Locke uses this law as part of
a justification for property rights. A basic and natural reading of the Lockean proviso,
then, is that when the holding or acquisition of property rights unnecessarily threatens
human life, we should change something about property dispositions to avoid the
unnecessary death caused by these property dispositions.7 The Lockean proviso is a
mechanism that works within theories of exclusive rights over goods. The mechanism
works to ensure that the rights do not leave agents who are excluded from the goods
disadvantaged, in a way relevant to the system of exclusive rights over goods. That is, an
exclusive right over goods is justified because the right protects and promotes some
value(s). According to the Lockean proviso mechanism, when those value(s) that the
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right is meant to protect and promote are threatened by the exercise of the right, then the
right should be changed so that it no longer undermines those values.
This makes the Lockean proviso an example of a more general rule regarding theoretical and practical consistency. Or, as Locke puts it: ‘The same law of nature, that does
by this means give us property, does also bound that property too.’8
To summarize, the Lockean proviso mechanism, as I am developing it here as an
adaptable theoretical/practical tool, can be articulated as the following rule:
When the exercise of an exclusive right over goods severely threatens the
value(s) that are used to justify the right (or system of rights of which it is a
part), then the right should be changed so that it no longer undermines those
values.
Adapting this understanding of the Lockean proviso to territorial rights requires that
we identify the values upon which territorial rights are founded.
A territorial right describes a relationship between the right-holder and a geographic
region. The central function of a territorial right is to give the right-holder the power to
establish justice within a particular region. A territorial right is first and foremost a right
of political authority.The holder of a territorial right has the moral and political authority
to establish justice — to establish a determinate jurisdiction — within a particular
geographical region. A jurisdiction is a legal domain where a certain set of legal rules
applies and a certain agency or agencies have authority to make, adjudicate, and enforce
those rules. The holder of a territorial right is an independent and autonomous power
within its territory.9
A justification for territorial rights must be a justification for a system of rights to land
held by groups that protects group autonomy in establishing justice within a geographical region. Essentially, territorial rights establish a practical foundation upon which a
group can exercise its right of self-determination. The right of self-determination is the
right of self-government. A group is self-governing if it has the independent and determinate political control over some important aspects of its members’ common life.
Self-determination requires both autonomy and independence. The self-determining
group is autonomous — it has the ability to govern itself by adjudicating, legislating, and
enforcing laws on its own, and it is independent — it has a domain of political control
independent of higher or foreign political units to which the group’s self-made laws are
subject to being overridden or revoked.10
If we understand ‘preservation of humankind’ as a foundational moral mandate for
property rights, then ‘the establishment of justice through the preservation of selfdetermining groups’ is a foundational moral mandate for territorial rights.
There is some controversy regarding the best understanding of self-determination.
Many theorists from different theoretical traditions argue that the unique selfdetermination of people’s is important.11 In contrast, Allen Buchanan claims that the
concept of self-determination, at least as it applies to territorial rights, is essentially about
the establishment of objective standards of justice within a region. On this view, if as the
result of a great ecological disaster, all of the Pacific Islanders had to immigrate to
Australia, and Australia treated these immigrants justly, nothing of value regarding selfdetermination would be lost.12 By contrast, I assume that the self-determination of a group
is unique to that group. For a group to be self-determining, they must have some sense of
internal identity that is uniquely advanced by the self-determining powers of the group. I
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mean this in a very broad sense, in a way that doesn’t presuppose nationalist or cultural
homogeneity within the group itself.There are many senses with which we could explain
the uniqueness of a group that is advanced by their self-determining status; the concepts
of public reason and of democratic association are two options that are not reliant on
cultural homogeneity of the group. All that I mean to capture in this assertion is that it is
more natural for us to say that the Pacific Islanders have lost something of value in the loss
of their unique self-determining status, even if they are granted immigration into a state
that treats them justly than to adopt a concept of self-determination related to territorial
rights (like Buchanan’s) that doesn’t allow for this understanding.
Territorial rights are justified because they protect and promote the self-determination
of peoples and the people’s capacities to establish justice through their territorial rights.
Territorial rights are also instrumentally and (possibly) intrinsically necessary for the
practice of self-determination. As a concept applied to the state internally, the group with
sovereignty has the authority to establish justice within the region, and this is central to
the right of self-determination. If a group is to be self-determining, it must rule itself. In
order for it to rule itself, it must have the authority to establish justice for its members.13
A group with a right to self-determination often requires territorial sovereignty in order
to be self-determining. Without territorial rights, the self-determining group may cease
to exist as a self-determining group.We can use this understanding of territorial rights to
understand how the Lockean proviso mechanism should be applied to territorial rights;
it is triggered when the self-determination of a group is threatened because of the
territorial dispositions of other groups.
So far I have articulated a general Lockean mechanism for establishing consistence
between principle and practice regarding exclusive rights over goods. This Lockean
proviso mechanism, applied to territorial rights, constrains a system of territorial rights
when that system threatens the continued existence of self-determining groups. In the
remainder of this essay I examine different variations of the Lockean proviso to determine
if a more specific version can be constructed for the case of ecological refugee states. In his
SecondTreatise of Civil Government, Locke specifies two restraints, or provisos, on property
rights.The first requires that property rights should leave ‘as much and as good’ left over
for others (sec. 27).14 The second, often called the spoilage proviso, requires that property
rights be limited to what one can take advantage of before it spoils.15 To a great extent, my
discussion here is limited to an interpretation of the former, ‘enough and as good’ proviso.
However, in the final section of the paper, I briefly discuss the spoilage proviso and how
it can be useful in helping to identify a location for something like New Tuvalu.
In my discussion of the ‘enough and as good’ proviso, I start with Jeremy Waldron’s
supersession thesis and from this a modification of Nozick’s waterhole example. I argue
that Waldron’s thesis, in order to work, must be understood as a thesis about the rights
of self-determining groups to territorial sovereignty. Moreover, I use the cases here to
demonstrate that the Lockean proviso applied to territorial rights cannot apply to the
acquisition of territory. It must instead apply to our understanding of legitimate holdings
or shares of territory.
Waldron and Supersession
In his well-received essay, ‘Superseding Historic Injustice’, Jeremy Waldron employs a
version of the Lockean proviso in order to argue that certain former colonies may be
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justified in retaining territorial sovereignty. I ultimately reject Waldron’s conclusion, but
because I develop Waldron’s use of the Lockean proviso for the case of ecological refugee
states, I explain his position here in some detail.
According to Waldron, under certain circumstances, justice permits past injustices of
colonization not to be redressed. It is likely, according to Waldron, that the injustice of
territorial conquest has been superseded in some cases.16 That is, in some cases, justice
demands that the past historical injustice of colonization not be redressed.
Waldron argues that a distribution of entitlements that is just under conditions of
plenty may be unjust if conditions change to conditions of scarcity. Likewise, a distribution of entitlements that is unjust under conditions of plenty may be just at a later time
if conditions change to conditions of scarcity. It is possible to imagine a pair of different
circumstances, C1 and C2, such that the entitlement cannot be justified in C1 and can
be justified in C2. The shift from C1 to C2 represents a ‘tipping…
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