Grand Canyon Dean Ellis v Mildred Elley Schooling Inc Case Paper “BRIEF” THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNED CASE IN WRITING. Take look the files and follow the instruc

Grand Canyon Dean Ellis v Mildred Elley Schooling Inc Case Paper “BRIEF” THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNED CASE IN WRITING. Take look the files and follow the instruction to do the case brief. Before do the brief take look the example first. Ellis v. Mildred Elley School Inc., 245 A.D.2d 994 (1997)
667 N.Y.S.2d 86, 123 Ed. Law Rep. 838, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 11421
245 A.D.2d 994
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department, New York.
Dean ELLIS, Appellant,
v.
MILDRED ELLEY SCHOOL INC., Respondent.
Dec. 31, 1997.
Student, who was stabbed during altercation with another
student, brought negligence action against business
school, alleging it breached its duty to protect him from
dangerous conduct of other student. The Supreme Court,
Albany County, Keegan, J., granted school’s motion for
summary judgment. Student appealed. The Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, Mikoll, J.P., held that: (1)
nondegree granting business school was functional
equivalent of college such that it was not a guarantor or
insurer of safety of its students, and (2) school was not on
notice of likelihood of dangerous conduct by other
student.
Affirmed.
Attorneys and Law Firms
seen looking through plaintiff’s book bag. An argument
and physical confrontation ensued. Plaintiff and Miller
were separated by defendant’s executive director, Robert
Flynn, who had been summoned by defendant’s Student
Services Coordinator, Patricia Frazier. **87 Miller was
escorted to his classroom by Flynn; Frazier took plaintiff
to her office, where she attempted to calm him and
inquire into the nature of the dispute. Shortly thereafter,
Miller appeared at Frazier’s office, and the two men
engaged in a second physical confrontation, during which
Miller stabbed plaintiff.
Plaintiff commenced this negligence action against
defendant, alleging in essence that defendant breached its
duty to protect plaintiff from the dangerous conduct of
Miller. After completion of discovery and examinations
before trial, defendant moved for summary judgment.
Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion, finding that
plaintiff failed to establish that defendant breached a legal
duty owed to plaintiff. We affirm.
To prevail upon a negligence claim, plaintiff must
establish the existence of a legal duty, a breach of that
duty, proximate causation and damages. The existence of
a legal duty presents a question of law for the court
(Eiseman v. State of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 518
N.Y.S.2d 608, 511 N.E.2d 1128; Talbot v. New York Inst.
of Technology, 225 A.D.2d 611, 639 N.Y.S.2d 135).
[1]
**86 Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg & Griffin P.C.
(Michael E. Ginsberg, of counsel), Troy, for appellant.
Carter, Conboy, Case, Blackmore, Napierski & Maloney
P.C. (Mark A. Rubeo, of counsel), Albany, for
respondent.
Before MIKOLL, J.P., and YESAWICH, PETERS,
SPAIN and CARPINELLO, JJ.
Opinion
*994 MIKOLL, Justice Presiding.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Keegan, J.),
entered February 19, 1997 in Albany County, which
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiff, age 31, and James Miller, age 48, were both
*995 enrolled students at defendant, a business school. On
November 17, 1994, plaintiff confronted Miller in the
school cafeteria about an allegation that Miller had been
Supreme Court first considered what, if any, duty was
owed to plaintiff by virtue of the relationship between
defendant, as a school, and plaintiff, as an enrolled
student. It is well-settled that colleges “have no legal duty
to shield their students from the dangerous activity of
other students” (Eiseman v. State of New York, supra, at
190, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 511 N.E.2d 1128). This principle
derives from the rejection of the notion that a college
stands in loco parentis so as to trigger a special duty of
protection. Implicit in this rejection is recognition of the
many factors which distinguish the relationship between a
college and its students from that of lower-level learning
institutions and their students. One such factor is the age
and maturity of the students and the concomitant need for
closer supervision of younger children (see, Talbot v. New
York Inst. of Technology, supra; Mintz v. State of New
York, 47 A.D.2d 570, 362 N.Y.S.2d 619).
[2]
We find that Supreme Court properly considered
defendant as the “functional equivalent” of a college.
Much of plaintiff’s argument on this point rests on the
claim that defendant is not *996 a “college” within the
meaning of Education Law § 2(2), but rather is a
non-degree granting business school, and that, as such, it
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
1
Ellis v. Mildred Elley School Inc., 245 A.D.2d 994 (1997)
667 N.Y.S.2d 86, 123 Ed. Law Rep. 838, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 11421
cannot avail itself of the rule that a college is neither a
guarantor nor insurer of the safety of its students (see,
Eiseman v. State of New York, supra). This argument is
eminently unpersuasive, ignoring as it does the rationale
behind the relaxed standard applicable to colleges and the
parallel conditions existing at defendant.
[3]
The next inquiry undertaken by Supreme Court was
whether defendant breached its duty, as a property owner,
to exercise reasonable care for the protection of persons
lawfully on its premises from reasonably foreseeable
criminal or dangerous acts of third persons. This inquiry,
in turn, entails a determination as to whether the property
owner has either actual or constructive notice of the
likelihood of dangerous conduct by a third person (see,
Nallan v. Helmsley–Spear Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 519, 429
N.Y.S.2d 606, 407 N.E.2d 451; Karp v. Saks Fifth Ave.,
225 A.D.2d 1014, 639 N.Y.S.2d 575; Provenzano v.
Roslyn Gardens Tenants Corp., 190 A.D.2d 718, 593
N.Y.S.2d 80).
[4]
Plaintiff contends that the record supports his claim that
defendant was on requisite notice by virtue of the initial
altercation between plaintiff and Miller, a threat made to
plaintiff by Miller immediately prior to the second fight, 1
prior occasions when Miller had allegedly “spoken out”
inappropriately in class and his claim that Miller always
carried a knife and had expressed his readiness to use it.
not ask for any assistance with respect to Miller after the
first altercation. In fact, moments before Miller
reappeared, plaintiff asked Frazier if he could leave her
office and return to the cafeteria. Defendant’s employees
testified that they had no prior knowledge of any
complaints or concerns regarding Miller, including any
allegation that he carried a knife. As to defendant’s notice
by virtue *997 of the earlier altercation, plaintiff
established only that defendant’s employees became
aware of a physical struggle in the cafeteria between
himself and Miller; they had no knowledge or information
as to its cause or who the aggressor may have been. The
second altercation occurred a very short time after the
first, and without warning. Miller’s alleged verbal threat,
if it occurred at all, was made moments before the second
altercation commenced, presenting defendant with no
opportunity to act in response thereto. “[S]chool
personnel cannot reasonably be expected to guard against
* * * an injury caused by the impulsive, unanticipated act
of a fellow student” (Mirand v. City of New York, 84
N.Y.2d 44, 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263; see,
Ruchalski v. Schenectady County Community Coll., 239
A.D.2d 687, 656 N.Y.S.2d 784; Silver v.
Sheraton–Smithtown Inn, 121 A.D.2d 711, 504 N.Y.S.2d
56).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
[5]
While ordinarily issues of actual or constructive notice,
and the consequent foreseeability of harm, present
questions of fact, our careful review of the record
supports Supreme Court’s conclusion that no such
material issues of fact existed as to whether **88
defendant had actual or constructive notice of any danger
to plaintiff.
The record discloses that plaintiff admitted that he never
informed defendant’s employees about any prior
problems with Miller before the date of his injury, never
informed them that Miller carried a knife, and that he did
YESAWICH, PETERS, SPAIN and CARPINELLO, JJ.,
concur.
All Citations
245 A.D.2d 994, 667 N.Y.S.2d 86, 123 Ed. Law Rep.
838, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 11421
Footnotes
1
Plaintiff testified at his examination before trial that, while he was in Frazier’s office, Miller appeared in the doorway and said “I
am going to get you, Big Guy”. Frazier testified that Miller said nothing before entering her office and resuming the struggle with
plaintiff.
End of Document
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
2
Ellis v. Mildred Elley School Inc., 245 A.D.2d 994 (1997)
667 N.Y.S.2d 86, 123 Ed. Law Rep. 838, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 11421
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
3
Democracy & Religious Freedom
EXAMPLES OF CASE BRIEFS
Sherbert v. Verner (1963))
FACTS
Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, was fired because she refused to work on Saturday,
her religion’s Sabbath. Unable to find another job that did not require a willingness to
work on Saturdays, she sought unemployment compensation benefits. She was denied
these benefits because the Employment Security Commission interpreted her
unwillingness to work on Saturdays as failure to accept suitable work offered to her.
ISSUE
Does the Free Exercise Clause forbid a state to deny unemployment compensation to a
claimant discharged from a job that would require her to work on her Sabbath?
HOLDING
Yes. The denial of unemployment compensation to a claimant fired from her job because
she is unwilling to work on her Sabbath violates her right to the free exercise of her
religion.
RATIONALE
A policy that disregards a claimant’s religious reasons for refusing employment burdens
her free exercise of her religion. She is put in the constitutionally untenable position of
having to choose between receiving unemployment benefits and following her religion.
The Court said that only a compelling state interest could justify such a burden on the
free exercise of religion. Furthermore, the state must show that its compelling interest
could not be satisfied by a less restrictive alternative. Here, an exemption could have
been made for Sabbatarians without undermining the state’s interest in ensuring that
benefits are paid only to claimants who were involuntarily unemployed. (Note: strict
scrutiny standard]
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)
FACTS
Defendant Yoder was convicted of violating Wisconsin’s compulsory education law when
he refused to send his children to school after the 8th grade. He believed that the two
years of compulsory high school education conflicted with the Amish religion’s tenets
that its members should learn informally to earn their living through farming and other
rural activities.
ISSUE
Whether the Free Exercise Clause requires states to grant the Amish an exemption from
full compliance with compulsory school attendance laws.
HOLDING
Yes. Denying the Amish an exemption from full compliance with compulsory school
attendance laws violates their right to the free exercise of their religion.
RATIONALE
Applying the strict scrutiny standard established for free exercise claims in the Sherbert
case, the Court recognized that the state had a compelling interest in having a citizenry
sufficiently educated to function effectively in society and to participate intelligently in the
political system. However, the Court said that an additional two years of education would
do little to advance the state’s interest in the case of the Amish, who had a good record
of preparing their children to function effectively in their self-sufficient community. A less
restrictive alternative is available here in the form of an exemption. The Court recognized
that the Amish belief and conduct is rooted in religious belief.

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